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2The Death Penalty and the Absolute Prohibition of 
Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment
by Juan E. Méndez*
IntroductIon
As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, I have the responsibility every year to 
select two emerging issues that contribute substantially to the 
debate on the prohibition of torture. The conclusions of these 
studies, along with my recommendations to States, are included 
in thematic reports. One of these reports is presented in March 
before the Human Rights Council, and another in October before 
the UN General Assembly. My most recent thematic report, 
presented in October 2012 to the General Assembly, explores 
the death penalty as it relates to the international prohibition of 
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT).
To date, the death penalty has generally been treated under 
the international standards and regulations governing the right 
to life, and in accordance with Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant); under 
certain circumstances, it has been considered a lawful sanction 
under international law. International law decidedly encourages 
abolition of the death penalty but does not require it. There 
is evidence, however, of an evolving standard within regional 
and local jurisprudence and state practice to frame the debate 
about the legality of the death penalty within the context of the 
fundamental concepts of human dignity and the prohibition of 
torture and CIDT. Regional and domestic courts have increas-
ingly held that the death penalty, both as a general practice 
and through the specific methods of implementation and other 
surrounding circumstances, can amount to CIDT or even torture. 
I therefore believe that further 
investigation into this evolving 
standard is needed in order to 
reexamine the legality of the 
death penalty under interna-
tional law, and to determine its 
implications for the global trend 
towards abolition.
Although it may still be 
con sidered that the death pen-
alty is not per se a violation of 
international law, my research 
suggests that international 
standards and practices are in 
fact moving in that direction. 
The ability of States to impose 
the death penalty without vio-
lating the prohibition of torture 
and CIDT is becoming increasingly restricted. Taking this into 
account, I have called upon all States to consider whether the use 
of the death penalty, as applied in the real world today, fails to 
respect the inherent dignity of the human person, causes severe 
mental and physical pain or suffering, and constitutes a violation 
of the prohibition of torture or CIDT.
overvIew of the death Penalty and the ProhIbItIon 
of torture and cIdt
Article 6 of the Covenant protects the right to life but allows 
the use of the death penalty under specific conditions. Among 
these conditions, the death penalty “may be imposed only for 
the most serious crimes,” and must be in accordance with both 
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and 
the provisions of the Covenant.1 Furthermore, the death penalty 
may only be imposed “pursuant to a final judgment rendered by 
a competent court” and may not be carried out against pregnant 
women or invoked for crimes committed by persons below the 
age of eighteen.2 The Covenant also notes that Article 6 may not 
be invoked to prevent or delay the abolition of the death penalty 
by States Parties.3
Article 7 of the Covenant, however, expressly prohibits the use 
of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.4 Under Article 1.1 of the Convention against Torture (CAT), 
torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person,” 
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3by, or with the instigation or consent of a public official or person 
acting in an official capacity, so as to intimidate, punish, or obtain 
information from the person, among other motives.5 Article 16.1 
of the CAT prohibits other acts 
of cruel, inhuman, and degrad-
ing treatment (CIDT) committed 
by, or with the instigation or 
consent of public officials, that 
cause pain and suffering but do 
not reach the level of severity of 
torture nor carry the same motive 
requirements.6 Under Article 1.1 
of the CAT, however, the defini-
tion of torture does not include 
“pain or suffering arising only 
from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions.”7 Some States 
and other international actors argue that, similar to Article 6 of 
the Covenant, Article 1.1 of the CAT provides an exception for the 
death penalty when conducted in accordance with the laws of the 
State imposing the sanctions.
As emphasized by various international judicial bodies, 
however, this interpretation may change over time.8 The proper 
understanding of Article 1.1 of the CAT should be that the “law-
ful sanctions” exception refers to sanctions that are lawful under 
both national and international law, and that practices initially 
considered lawful under domestic law may still violate Article 
1 if they constitute violations of international human rights law.
The prohibition of corporal punishment offers an example of 
such an evolving standard. Once considered to be a lawful form 
of sanction, numerous decisions by treaty bodies and regional 
and domestic courts have held that various forms of corporal 
punishment violate Article 1 of the CAT. It is now widely 
accepted that corporal punishment amounts per se to CIDT or 
torture, and no longer qualifies as a “lawful sanction.”9
actual PractIces of caPItal PunIshment
Aside from the issue of whether capital punishment consti-
tutes a per se violation of the prohibition of torture and CIDT, 
specific methods of execution and other circumstances related to 
the implementation of the death penalty, including the so-called 
“death row phenomenon,” often constitute violations in and of 
themselves. Evolving state practice and international opinion, 
including responses to new developments in forensic science, 
highlight the extreme difficulty of implementing the death 
penalty without violating the prohibition of torture and CIDT.
Several methods of execution have been explicitly deemed 
violations of the prohibition of torture and CIDT by interna-
tional or domestic judicial bodies and have been prohibited by 
a number of States retaining the death penalty. The European 
Court of Human Rights has held that death by stoning consti-
tutes torture,10 and the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights described stoning as a particularly cruel and inhuman 
means of execution.11 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee 
has held that execution by gas asphyxiation constitutes CIDT, 
pointing to the length of time that this method takes to kill a 
person and the availability of other, less cruel methods.12 The 
Committee refrained from deciding what other specific methods 
of execution might constitute torture or CIDT, holding instead that 
the death penalty, in all cases, “must be carried out in such a way 
as to cause the least possible physical and mental suffering.” 13
It has been argued that 
various other methods of 
execution constitute CIDT 
or torture, although there has 
not been a clear consensus 
in international opinion and 
practice. Such has been the 
case of execution by hang-
ing,14 which some interna-
tional and domestic judicial 
bodies have indicated may 
constitute CIDT or torture.15 
Similarly, the Human Rights 
Committee decided in 1994 that lethal injection did not amount 
to torture or CIDT and has yet to review its decision despite the 
emergence of new forensic evidence that indicates otherwise.16
The fact that a number of execution methods have been 
deemed to constitute torture or CIDT, together with a growing 
trend to review all methods of execution for their potential to 
cause severe pain and suffering, highlights the increasing dif-
ficulty with which a state may impose the death penalty without 
violating international law.
The “death row phenomenon” is a relatively new concept 
that has emerged within the context of the implementation of 
the death penalty and the prohibition of torture and CIDT. The 
phenomenon refers to a combination of circumstances that pro-
duce severe mental trauma and physical suffering in prisoners 
serving death row sentences, including prolonged periods wait-
ing for uncertain outcomes, solitary confinement, poor prison 
conditions, and lack of educational and recreational activities. 
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4The European Court of Human Rights has held that prolonged 
periods of time spent on death row awaiting execution violate 
the prohibition of CIDT.17 This decision, however, was based not 
only on the length of time spent on death row, but also on the 
personal circumstances of the inmate, including age and mental 
state.18 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights have similarly held that 
prison conditions, together with the anxiety and psychological 
suffering caused by prolonged periods on death row, constitute 
a violation of the prohibition of torture and CIDT.19
the death Penalty as a vIolatIon Per Se
In certain cases, international law expressly considers the 
death penalty to be a violation per se of the prohibition of torture 
or CIDT. These standards hold that executions of persons belong-
ing to certain groups, such as juveniles,20 persons with mental 
disabilities,21 pregnant women, elderly persons, and persons sen-
tenced after an unfair trial,22 are 
considered particularly cruel and 
inhuman, regardless of the spe-
cific methods of implementation 
or other attendant circumstances.
Although international law 
does not attribute a different value 
to the right to life of these particu-
lar groups, it holds that the impo-
sition of the death penalty in such 
cases per se constitutes CIDT. 
These standards are based on the 
established belief that the execu-
tion of such persons is inher-
ently cruel. The prohibition on 
the execution of juveniles is also 
considered a jus cogens norm, 
an imperative rule that binds all 
States.23 Similarly, an increasing 
number of regional and domes-
tic courts, including the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights 
and the United States Supreme Court, have held that the manda-
tory death penalty, where judges have no discretion to consider 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances with respect to the crime 
or the offender, violates due process and amounts to CIDT.24
International standards holding the death penalty in certain 
cases to constitute CIDT, as well as the regulation of specific 
methods of execution and other surrounding circumstances, 
highlight the difficulty with which States may implement the 
death penalty without violating the prohibition of torture or 
CIDT. Concurrently, these standards and practices also illustrate 
a developing global trend to reconsider capital punishment in all 
cases as a violation per se of the prohibition of torture or CIDT.
the PossIble emergence of a customary norm
The prohibition of torture is a non-derogable customary 
and jus cogens norm that no State is allowed to ignore. The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice defines customary 
international law in Article 38(1)(b) as “evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law.” This is usually determined through 
state practice applied under a sense of legal obligation or opinio 
juris. Evidence of state practice and opinio juris can be found 
in the signing and ratification of treaties, policy statements, and 
the votes and resolutions of political decision-making bodies.
The growing trend toward the abolition of the death penalty 
as imposed on certain individuals, and the regulation of the 
particular methods of implementation, reflect the irreconcilable 
conflict between the lawful imposition of the sanction and the 
prohibition of torture or CIDT under international law. A report 
presented in July 2012 by the UN Secretary-General on the 
death penalty evidences and highlights this trend.25 The report 
states that approximately 150 of the 193 Member States of the 
UN have abolished the death penalty for all crimes and that in 
those States that retain it there is an observable trend among 
many of them to restrict its use or to call for a moratorium 
on executions.26 Another document that pro-
vides evidence of this trend and, at the same time, 
constitutes a reflection of the 
international movement toward 
abolition is the 2011 UN General 
Assembly Resolution calling for a 
moratorium on the use of the death 
penalty with a view to achieve its 
abolition.27 In August 2012 the 
UN Secretary-General reported to 
the UN General Assembly on the 
developments of the implementa-
tion of that resolution and noted 
that several States had either 
abolished the death penalty, intro-
duced amendments to abolish it, 
stopped its application for certain 
crimes, or had adopted a morato-
rium on the executions.28
Yet, the conflict between the 
application of the death penalty 
and the prohibition of torture 
and CIDT is most evident in the 
growing number of regional and domestic opinions and deci-
sions that have held the death penalty in all cases to constitute 
CIDT or even torture, regardless of the methods or circum-
stances of implementation, or the particular individuals upon 
whom it is imposed.29 The European Court of Human Rights, 
for example, has held that the death penalty constitutes CIDT or 
even torture, citing various resolutions of the European Human 
Rights System that call for the abolition of the death penalty, 
and stating that the definition of torture must evolve with 
democratic society’s understanding of the term.30 Similarly, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has consis-
tently encouraged the abolition of the death penalty in Africa, 
expressing concerns that executions will constitute a violation 
of the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (African Charter), specifically Article 4, which states that 
human beings are inviolable, with every human being entitled to 
respect for his life and the integrity of his person, and Article 
5, which guarantees the right to respect of the dignity inherent 
in a human being. In its resolutions, the African Commission 
urged States Parties that retain the death penalty to consider 
[T]he conflict between the 
application of the death penalty and 
the prohibition of torture and CIDT is 
most evident in the growing number 
of regional and domestic opinions 
and decisions that have held the death 
penalty in all cases to constitute 
CIDT or even torture, regardless 
of the methods or circumstances of 
implementation, or the particular 
individuals upon which it is imposed.
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5establishing a moratorium on executions, with a view to abolish-
ing this practice.31
In Gregg v. Georgia 32 (1976), U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
William J. Brennan argued in his dissenting opinion in the case 
that allowed for reinstatement or the death penalty that it is a 
moral principle that “the State, even as it punishes, must treat its 
citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human 
beings—a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading 
to human dignity.” Similarly, a significant number of domes-
tic courts have held that 
the death penalty per se 
violates the prohibition 
of torture and CIDT, 
including the South 
African Constitutional 
Court,33 the Canadian 
Supreme Court,34 and 
the Constitutional Courts 
of Albania, Hungary, 
Lithuania, and Ukraine.35 
These decisions are con-
sistent with the abolition 
of the death penalty in a 
number of U.S. states based on the justification that the death 
penalty itself constitutes an extreme form of physical and psy-
chological suffering, thereby violating the prohibition of torture 
and CIDT.36
It can be said, therefore, that there is an evolving standard in 
international law to consider the death penalty in all cases as a 
violation per se of the prohibition of torture and CIDT. Although 
my report does not aim to determine the existence of such a cus-
tomary norm, I firmly believe that a customary norm prohibiting 
the death penalty under all circumstances is at least in the pro-
cess of formation. In the exchange before the General Assembly 
on October 23, 2012, I advocated the creation of a special rap-
porteurship within the United Nations on capital punishment 
that would undertake, among other things, a broad consultation 
with experts to determine the existence of such customary norm 
or the status of its development.
conclusIons
The report examines the growing trend in international law 
to frame the debate about the legality of the death penalty within 
the context of the prohibition of torture and CIDT. I argue that a 
customary norm considering the death penalty to be a violation 
per se, if not already established, is currently in the process of 
development.
Even if this norm has 
not yet been established, 
I argue that the rigor-
ous conditions applied 
to the imposition of the 
death penalty under 
international law make 
retention of this punish-
ment by states costly 
and impractical. These 
regulations include strict 
due process guarantees, 
restrictions on the specific methods of execution, prevention of 
the “death row phenomenon” and other related circumstances, 
and the prohibition on the execution of certain individuals. Even 
with such conditions in place, however, states cannot guarantee 
that the prohibition of torture will not be violated in each case.
I believe it is necessary for the international community to 
discuss this issue further and for states to reconsider whether the 
death penalty per se fails to respect the inherent dignity of the 
human person and violates the prohibition of torture or CIDT. 
I have also called on all states currently employing the death 
penalty to strictly observe the standards and conditions imposed 
by Article 7 of the Covenant and Articles 1 and 16 of the CAT 
in regards to the particular methods of implementation of execu-
tion and other related circumstances.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan 
argued that it is a moral principle that “the State, 
even as it punishes, must treat its citizens in a 
manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as 
human beings—a punishment must not be so 
severe as to be degrading to human dignity.”
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